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Summary / Resume 
 
Det filosofiske problem  omhandlende  mennesker frie vilje til at vælge, også kendt 
som “the free will problem”, der er blevet diskuteret siden Aristoteles tid, har ændret 
sig meget siden man i begyndte at gøre videnskabelige opdagelser inden for neuroner. 
Synspunkterne der bliver arbejdet med indenfor diskussionen de inkompatibilistiske 
synsvinkler determinisme og libertarianisme, og den kompatibilistiske synsvinkel at 
fri vilje kan gå sammen med determinisme. 
Målet med dette projekt er først og fremmest at eksaminere de forskellige 
synspunkters mening om fri vilje. Derudover at undersøge hvordan bevidsthed 
(consciousness) og fri vilje har en betydning for hinanden og hvad denne kunne være. 
 
 
 
Projektet er bygget op af en samtale mellem en fra hver af de tre synsvinkler og en 
neutral person. De fire diskuterer deres holdninger, og teorien disse bygger på er 
placeret som små afsnit hvor den er relevant i forhold til karakterernes diskussion. 
 
 
 
Det bliver klart i løbet af diskussionen at de libertarianistiske argumenter ikke kan 
hamle op med de deterministiske der har nyere videnskab på sin side, og hun dør som 
symbol på sit argumentære nederlag.   
 
 
 
Trods alle argumenterne fra de sidste to synsvinkler, ender det med at den neutrale 
går sin vej uden ændret holdning, hvilket efterlader ham lignende mest en 
libeteranist. 
Dette er et symbol for at den holdning og viden man nu engang har om fri vilje ikke 
nødvendigvis er drastisk livsændrende, og at ligegyldigt hvor gode argumenter man 
har, er det svært at acceptere at man ikke har fri vilje når det nu engang føles som om 
man har. 
 
 
 
Til sidst komkluderes det er bevidsthedens betydning for fri vilje handler om hvordan 
man definerer koncepterne og ens grad af bevidsthed. er man meget bevidst i den 
forstand at man er fokuseret og reflekterende har man en højere grad af fri vilje end 
over det man er bevidst men uopmærksom på. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This project is concerned with the free will problem and what it have done to the 
discussion. 
New science have provided determinism with strong arguments, which give the 
libertarians and a good part of compatibilist, holding the view that free will is 
compatible with free will, a hard time. 
The main aim is to examine the connection between consciousness and free will 
within these view. 
The basis of this project is based on a combination of a conversation between the 
three opinions in combination with the relevant theory. 
  
Introduction 
 
 
Most of us if asked “do we have free will” would probably answer, that of course we 
do. The question of free will have been discussed by philosophers at least as far back 
as 322BC. Later the sciences made large imprint on the discussion, particularly 
neuroscience and quantum mechanics have been heavily discussed. This have lead to 
what seems some good arguments that we do in fact not have free will, because 
everything is determined. Both that out free will remains and that it does not, is 
argued within philosophy. We found it interesting to look at these newly arisen 
arguments that we do not in fact have free will. Besides these two oppositions on this 
so called free will problem, there is also a group of philosophers arguing that this 
existence of free will can actually go together with a determined world. When we 
first started reading about the two oppositions, we found this option difficult, and 
decided to go more in depth with that idea too. 
In the end we then ended up with three points of views on the free will problem to 
work with, which will be introduced in next chapter. 
 
 
The purpose of this project has been to look into the concept of free will. and how 
consciousness plays a role in the understanding of free will. we came up with a 
problem formulation which we have tried to answer in this project. 
  
 
Do we have free will? If we do, how does consciousness then relate to or 
affect the concept of free will? 
 
 
 
The term free will cannot be easily defined. And we quickly found that trying to talk 
about free will a clearly defined concept would not get us where we wanted. This 
lead a big part of the project to focus on exactly what is meant when we say free will. 
The project oscillate between an theory part that explores the current thoughts on the 
subject and an dialogue that tries to argue back and forth between the different 
opinions on free will, this is with the purpose of making the project more interesting 
to read, and helps us portraying the  critical questions which naturally rose in our 
discussions. From here on out we will try to guide you through the different concepts 
and thoughts on free will and in particularly how consciousness plays a role in the 
debate. 
This project will not go into depth with philosophy of mind, also called the hard  
problem, even though we found later in the process that it could have been very 
interesting and relevant. But it simply did not work within our timeframe. 
 
 
 
 
 EXPLAINING THE MAIN CONCEPTS 
 
 
 
In our project we will mainly be dealing with four relevant theoretical concepts 
dealing with the problem of free will: hard determinism, libertarianism, 
compatibilism and consciousness. We will introduce them here very briefly, since 
they are going to be explained in more detail in the course of the project. 
 
 
 
Free will debate: We talk about free will when we speak of control of our decisions 
and the actions that follow them. Thomas Pink introduces the free will problem in the 
following way: we understand that there are things that are outside our control, for 
instance, what has happened before our birth or what universe we are living in - these 
things are not up to us. However, there are things that we think we do control, such as 
our everyday actions; for example, whether to go to work by bus or to bike, whether 
to accept a tedious but well-paid job offer or not - we feel that these things we are in 
charge of (Pink, 2004: 2). However, philosophy challenges these common-sense 
intuitions and makes us contemplate whether everything is really so clear-cut as we 
think. Let us take a look at the three dominant theories of the free will debate.  
 
 
 
Hard determinism: Determinists state that determinism is true, therefore, we do 
not have free will. It is a theory that “everything results from a deterministic causal 
chain” (Fischer, 2005: 1), meaning that our universe is governed by strict laws. 
Determinists believe that a human being is just “a cog in the great universe-machine” 
(Blackburn, 1999: 94), not able to do or decide anything on his or her own, so we all 
are puppets governed by the laws of the universe. 
Determinism has been a hot topic within many different dimensions. There are four 
types of determinism, that are relevant in the discussions of responsibility and free 
will: logical, theological, psychological, and physical determinism. To discuss the 
problem laid out in this project, two of these types of determinism are left out. We 
will shortly argue why. The theological deterministic argument is based on the belief 
that God is omniscient. This argument relies on the existence of God, and we decided 
to leave this type of determinism out of the scope of this project. Logical determinism 
assumes that the future “is fixed as unalterably as the past”. This might remind of 
fatalism, which maintains a belief in fate or a predetermined future. Neither 
theological, nor logical deterministic view would be relevant to our discussion, so we 
have decided to leave these two types out. 
Physical determinism, on the other hand, seems to provide us with a significant 
aspect. Its belief is based on the laws of nature, and “the claim that all other features 
of the world are dependent on physical factors.” Psychological determinism, in turn, 
is based on the idea that knowing about a person's past experiences, one can by the 
use of certain psychological laws predict responses of this person in different 
situations. We found this idea interesting from the beginning and it also connects to 
physical determinism in the sense that one's psychological states might be determined 
and/or controlled by something physical. However, on the other hand, it seems that 
the aim of psychological determinism relies more within explaining behavior of 
people, which falls out of our subject. (Oxfordscolarship;chap 12). 
Duncan will in the following chapter representing this point of view. 
  
 
Libertarianism: Libertarians state that we do have free will. They believe that a 
person’s choice is not determined by the physical conditions that are outside of 
person’s control. Libertarians believe that free will requires that we possess the 
ability to originate our decisions. That is, they hold the belief that our decisions arise 
in us and cannot be traced back to a prior chain of events that have an external 
source. This is not possible if determinism is true because, in that case, the origin of 
our decisions would actually lie in the events that took place earlier, even before our 
birth. Thus, a decision should be considered free if the person in question can be 
regarded as its sole author (Iredale, 2012: 17). Certainly, it is difficult to judge what 
influence the person’s upbringing and environment do to the decision. One may have 
doubts if there ever has been a decision of which an individual might say that he or 
she has been the only author. But the fact that we can think of ourselves as being in 
control of our decisions and actions, makes sense of the life that we are living. 
This view will be represented by Konoa. 
 
 
 
Compatibilism: Compatibilism states that we, as human beings, are entirely placed 
inside the causal order of nature but at the same time there is a difference from 
determinism. The freedom they claim, as Simon Blackburn points out, lies in the way 
how actions flow out of our cognitive processes (Blackburn, 1999: 96). In other 
words, compatibilists agree that our actions are causally determined but that our 
cognitive processes, such as desires, emotions and motivations, allow room for 
freedom. Compatibilism holds that if the terms of freedom and free will are 
understood in the compatibilist sense of the term, it is not a problem to embrace both 
free will and causal determinism. 
This will be represented by Consuela. 
 
 
 
Consciousness: According to Gregg Caruso, there can be distinguished three main 
positions that one can take regarding the relationship between consciousness and free 
will. First, there are those who consider that consciousness is necessary for us to have 
our freedom; second, there are those who believe that a thorough understanding of 
consciousness reveals that free will is an illusion, and, lastly, there are those who 
claim that consciousness plays no role when discussing free will (Caruso, 2012: 97). 
In our project we will be touching upon the first and the second position of the role of 
consciousness in the free will debate. 
 
 
 
Delimitations: The discussion of free will is difficult to imagine without 
mentioning the problem of moral responsibility. However, we have deliberately 
chosen not to explore it in the course of this paper. It is a vast discussion in itself and 
requires a separate groundwork, therefore, we will later suggest it as potentially 
further research. 
 
 
 
It needs to be mentioned that we will be operating with rather strict notions of 
libertarianism and determinism, while quite a broad perspective on compatibilist 
theory on free will will be taken into account. We have chosen to do it this way, so 
that we could have the libertarian and the determinist characters to have strong 
opinions, and only one character (the compatibilist) in some way or another to change 
her view representing the broad aspect of one of the theories. Besides, it seemed 
easier to differentiate the sort of free will the characters were talking about, when 
having the compatibilist covering all the “compromising” theories, and the 
determinist and the libertarian holding on to free will understood as something 
breaking the chain of cause and effect. But more on this later. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Philosophers have been engaging in numerous discussions about free will: the 
question if we as rational and independent agents are able to choose from among 
various alternatives, or if everything that we do has been causally determined. We 
think of ourselves as able to make free choices and act according to them. But is this 
true? In the following discussion we will see if this statement remains unchallenged. 
 
 
 
The scene: a hot dog stand. Candide, a typical curious young man, stops by to satisfy 
his hunger. Two other people, Duncan and Konoa, stand nearby eating an ice cream. 
They love to engage in philosophical disputes and today is no exception. 
 
 
 
Candide (mumbling to himself): I can't decide between hotdog and French fries… 
such a difficult choice. I’ll go for a hot dog. 
Duncan: Of course, you will. 
Candide: What do you mean - of course? I could just as well have chosen fries. 
Duncan: Eerm, I don’t think so. 
Candide: I’m not sure I understand... You mean - I only could have chosen the 
hotdog? 
Duncan: If you think about it, your choice was already determined in beforehand. 
 
 
Candide looks confused back at Duncan. 
 
 
Duncan: Well, you see, your choice to pick a hot dog is just an effect of earlier 
events. Every event in the world is caused by a chain of earlier events, constituting a 
chain of causes and effects. For instance, maybe you sensed the smell of hot dogs 
from outside, or you have been thinking about having a hotdog for a longer time but 
didn’t manage to buy it, or maybe you have certain food preferences that determine 
your choice in a situation like this. The point is, that something happened to you too, 
which in turn was caused by something else, and this is just a continuation of a chain 
of events or effects in you, which causes your final choice. 
Candide: Hmm, I’m not quite sure I understand what you are hinting at? I think I can 
understand how earlier events could affect my choice though. In fact, when I think 
back, I have always preferred hot dogs to French fries, but in the end, the choice I 
made was still mine. I could have chosen the fries even though I normally would have 
chosen the hot dog. 
Duncan: No you see, what you just said describes perfectly something that is called 
causal relations. Everything is causally dependent on something else. Moreover, 
causal relations are empirically proved as the laws of nature tell us. For example if 
you throw a chair out of the window of the third floor, it will fall down to the ground 
instead of flying up in the air. 
 
 
 
(HARD DETERMINISM) 
 
 
Duncan introduces what can be described as hard determinism. Determinism is a 
complex concept with various definitions. In this project, there will be operated with 
the definition offered by Stanford Encyclopedia and which is said to be “nearly all-
encompassing”: 
“Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism 
if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go 
thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.” (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy; 2010; Introduction)  
One has to consider it being the entire world, at any time, because everything might 
have an influence. For instance, the light of a star causing a person to stop and stare: 
one has to consider even the space, and even the time it takes the light to reach earth 
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; 2010; 2.2). A thing that makes it only ‘nearly 
all-encompassing’ is the unclear definition of laws of nature. But this is hard to 
define since some philosophers do not even belief those to exist. Nevertheless, even 
undefined, laws of nature logically have to be within the definition of determinism 
for it to make any sense. If not, the existence of miracles would be within 
determinism, which is not the case. 
  
 
Determinism means, that every event is caused by previous events, and therefore they 
are all determined. All of human actions, including decision making, could not have 
been different. Determinism does not mean that everything can be predicted, as one 
might easily have come to think by now, but works within ‘conditional 
predictability’, meaning that if certain logically or conceptually possible knowledge 
existed, then it would be predictable (Honderich;1998;337). The truth - or falseness 
of determinism has not been agreed on, but both sides have been argued for (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy; 2010; 3.1). 
 
 
 
We see that Duncan’s argument stands strong - everything in this world might be 
determined, including our preferences for a certain type of fast food. According to 
determinists, each and every particle that we consist of is under the firm grip of the 
laws of nature. The smallest particles that the human body is built of, act in a certain 
way and an individual cannot do anything other than he or she at the certain moment 
does. That means that humans do not possess the free will to choose, since they are 
subject to the laws of nature just as everything else. However, the discoveries in 
quantum mechanics seem to suggest otherwise. 
 
 
 
Konoa: Duncan, you say that we are controlled by the laws of nature and that these 
are causal. I do not think it is true. The other day I read in a newspaper that recent 
experiments in quantum mechanics have shown that the movements of the smallest 
particles - that we and the objects around us are made of - is not causal. It rather 
seems to follow a pattern of randomness. 
Candide: I see, these findings actually show that Duncan’s idea of our actions being 
determined doesn’t hold at the very micro-level of our lives? 
Konoa: Exactly. 
 
 
 
(INDETERMINACY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS) 
 
 
 
What Konoa puts forth is the theory that libertarianism is backed up by modern 
quantum physics, according to which the world is indeterministic at the level of the 
smallest particles. The motions of these particles lack determining causes or patterns 
(Pink, 2004: 15), hence we can say that this is a physical proof that world on the 
microscopic level is not deterministic. The events in the quantum world can be 
interpreted as microphysical events that just happen. Simon Blackburn notes that in 
quantum mechanics there are no hidden variables: one system could be in exactly the 
same state as another; yet in one system an event happens but in the other it does not 
(Blackburn, 1999: 84). This occurs despite the two systems being in an identical 
state. Therefore, we can conclude that such events are not brought about causally (it 
is just the opposite - they appear to be uncaused) and cannot be explained 
scientifically by the physical laws of the nature as we know them so far. Quantum 
physics rejects determinism, it interprets the events as having a probabilistic nature 
(they happen or they do not happen) but it cannot determine whether the event will 
occur or not (84). Quantum indeterminacy seems to be valid to prove that Candide’s 
choice to order a hotdog was not determined. However, it appears that it is not 
enough to allow a room for free will, as Duncan explains further. 
 
 
 
Duncan: I can’t argue against quantum mechanics, these findings, as you already 
mentioned, have been proved scientifically. But it doesn’t mean that it allows 
Candide to choose and act according to his free will. 
Candide: Sorry - what exactly do you mean when you say “free will”, Duncan? 
Konoa: I can explain. In short, free will is understood as a sort of capacity of a 
person to choose a course of action among several alternatives. It suggests that we, 
as free agents, have alternative ways of choosing and acting and that it is entirely 
“up to us” what decisions or actions we decide to carry out. 
Candide: Right, I got it. 
Konoa: Moreover, those who believe in free will suggest that the beginning of our 
actions lie in no one else but us, that the source of our actions are we ourselves and 
not something external over which we have no control, such as God, laws of nature, 
our upbringing, or other people. 
Candide: I could buy that. 
 
 
 
Konoa represents the stance that is called libertarianism. Libertarians suppose that 
free will requires that we possess the ability to originate our decisions. That is, they 
hold the belief that our decisions arise in us and cannot be traced back to a prior chain 
of events that have an external source. This is not possible if determinism is true 
because, in that case, the origin of our decisions would actually lie in the events that 
took place earlier, even before our birth. Thus, a decision should be considered as 
free if the person in question can be regarded as its sole author (Iredale, 2012: 17). 
Contrary to determinists, who believe that everything that happens in our life has its 
causes in the past, libertarians say that when people, as free agents, decide how they 
would act, their action must come from themselves and nothing else that might 
determine the nature of the action (Pink, 2004: 80). In other words, in order to say 
that the control over our actions is real, it is necessary that it comes from us and not 
from preceding causes that are outside of us as free agents. 
 
 
 
Free will libertarians hold the belief that, on a given occasion, we have the power or 
the ability, with our past just as it has been and our present just as it is, to decide 
differently or opposite of what we have decided. That is to say, we have different 
alternatives regarding our choice, and we could have acted differently under the same 
conditions (Iredale, 2012: 18). Jennifer Trusted explains: 
 
 
 
When libertarians say that there is free choice, they are saying that an 
action is free because the agent could have chosen to act differently and 
could in fact have acted differently. He or she could have chosen and 
acted differently despite all the physical 
                  conditions remaining the same. (Trusted, 1984: 94) 
 
 
 
Libertarians’ view on free will can be rounded up in one sentence: “the future is 
open, alterable, to some extent malleable by us” (Iredale, 2012: 18). It means that the 
future is open to us and it displays an array of different alternatives. We can choose 
among these alternatives as we wish because we are able to originate our decisions of 
the choices that we make. Undoubtedly, this free will libertarianist view is inviting to 
most of us. However, Duncan seems to have stumbled upon something that might 
threaten the libertarian concept of free will. 
 
 
 
Konoa: Duncan, a moment ago you wanted to argue that the random nature 
regarding the movements of sub-atoms doesn’t justify my belief in free will. Could 
you explain what you meant by that? I, on the contrary, see that randomness is a very 
strong argument against the determined nature of the world that you are trying to 
impose on us. 
Duncan: If you think more carefully about it, quantum indeterminacy doesn’t make 
your standpoint regarding free will more valid. Namely, if everything is governed by 
randomness, how would you know that the decision you make is yours and not 
influenced by a pure chance? 
Konoa: Hmm… 
Duncan: You see, your suggestion that our actions are outcomes of random particle 
movements does not help your argument for free will than the suggestion that all the 
actions are determined. In either case - free will, as you want to account for, is non-
existent. 
 
 
 
(RANDOMNESS PROBLEM) 
 
 
 
Duncan seems to own every argument against the libertarian free will. An important 
feature for the concept of free will is that the individual himself or herself is in 
control of his or her actions. However, the point that Konoa tries to make (that 
random events give more freedom to an agent) does not give the agent more control 
than Duncan’s suggestion that all the actions are determined by the laws of nature. 
This criticism is called the randomness problem. As mentioned above, the sub-atomic 
particles are moving randomly, without a deterministic pattern. This randomness also 
excludes the notion of an individual’s control over their decisions - how can a person 
say that he or she has control over his or her deeds if the process is taking place 
outside his or her control - decided by a mere chance? (Pink, 2004: 16) Paul Davies 
puts forward a following scenario: 
 
 
 
“If electrodes were planted in your brain and triggered at random by an external 
source, you would regard that form of interference as a reduction of your freedom: 
someone “taking over”, or at least impeding, the operation of your brain. How can 
random quantum quirks inside your head represent anything other than “noise”?” 
(Davies, 1983: 140) 
 
 
 
Therefore, as Duncan rightly observes, if we equate free will to randomness, it would 
not be free will anymore, as it would be based on randomness and chanciness instead 
of freedom. 
 
 
 
Duncan: Besides, the fact that the particles are moving about randomly, doesn't 
change the fact that on a larger scale everything seems to follow a strict causal 
relation. Just think about how computers work - their functions are based on 
quantum mechanics, however, they do perform very regular and determined 
functions, which follow a certain structure that the humans have set them to perform. 
Konoa: That does not mean we don't have free will. You can’t possibly compare 
computers or any other object to a human being, can you? You see, we possess 
something that the objects don’t - we are able to reflect on the processes that happen 
to us. Computers don’t have the ability to reflect, they don’t inhabit the mental world 
as the humans do. Don’t you think that the mental world is different from the physical 
world? And it is the mental world that makes room for free will.    
Duncan: I see your point. However, even mental events do follow the laws of nature. 
Our brain is made of physical substance, which is under control of the laws of nature, 
and in that sense is not much different from other natural phenomena, just as the 
tides are influenced by the alignment between the Sun and the Moon, for example. 
Konoa: I don't see why this has to be so complicated. A person can feel that he or she 
has free will, it is so obvious. Candide, don't you remember the first thing you said? 
That you chose a hotdog over the fries, and you truly believed that you did so out of 
your own free will, instead of a particle changing its movement and influencing your 
choice? 
Duncan: That is not a good enough argument. You can’t just say that you feel free, 
therefore you are free. 
  
 
(INTROSPECTIVE ARGUMENT) 
 
 
 
Konoa explains that we, as human beings, would like to think that we possess the 
freedom to choose, and that it is up to us to decide what actions we perform. Thomas 
Pink rightly states that the very thought that even before our birth all our actions were 
predetermined, seems as a threat to our freedom. We naturally suppose that free will 
is not compatible with determinism, thus many of us embrace libertarianism as the 
natural theory of freedom (Pink: 2004: 14). We can call it the introspective argument 
for free will. Libertarians take this introspective feeling as their main evidence for 
free will: ‘I feel myself free, therefore, I am free’ (Caruso, 2012: 141). However, 
determinists think that the plain feeling of having free will amounts to very little and 
is not an evidence enough to prove an individual’s freedom. In his reply Duncan 
attempted to point that out. However, Konoa does not want to give up that easily. 
 
 
 
Konoa: What would be the point in being able to think about the decision if you do 
not possess this choice anyways? This feeling that I make an inherent choice, which 
corresponds to my own wishes, must mean something? 
Duncan: I can understand why you feel like we should have free will, it can feel 
unnatural to let it go and admit that you do not have a say over your own decisions 
and actions. But the fact that you feel it as a natural thing is not a valid proof at all 
for free will. Anyone can claim to feel something that does not make it true. 
Konoa: It seems to me that there must be more than just the physical. I can 
acknowledge that there is a connection between the mental and the physical world; I 
can’t deny that when people take drugs or medication it does affect their mental state. 
But I find that the mental must be the dominant, because it is not bound the way the 
physical is. And, the physical and the mental are definitely separate things. Though 
they can and do have an impact on the other, the physical is not the decisive factor. 
Duncan: How can it not be? I agree that mental and physical are connected, but the 
mental always depends on the physical. Mental experience is merely a byproduct of 
the physical, an extra feature. But it is nothing in itself. And the physical is most 
certainly determined, from which follows that the mental is too. 
Candide: But what makes you say that it seems to reduce all thoughts to a 
“byproduct”? 
Duncan: Well you see, I only believe the world to be consisting of one substance and 
that is physical substance. Humans can have mental property but that is merely an 
extra feature as a result of what happens physically. You see, I hold the same view as 
Thomas Huxley, the British biologist, who said that mental features attribute as much 
to the physical world as steam whistle does to the work of a locomotive. 
 
 
 
 (EPIPHENOMENALISM) 
 
 
 
Duncan seems to hold a position that is called epiphenomenalism. According to 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, epiphenomenalism states that the mental 
features are brought about by physical reactions in the brain but that they have no 
control over the events in the physical world. Epiphenomenalism views the world as 
consisting only of one type of substance, and that is physical stuff. However, objects 
or humans that are made of this physical stuff can possess mental property, which is 
emotions, feelings and consciousness, for instance. But the decisive thing is that this 
mental property works as an added value - it is an extra thing that is put on top of the 
physical stuff that we are made of, but is not inherent in it (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy; 2011; Epiphenominalism). 
 
 
 
Candide: So, you agree that there is such a thing as mental and physical substance, 
but disagree on how they might or might not be relevant to each other. And as long 
as the mental is causal, we have no free will right? 
Konoa: Yes, that is the problem. And Duncan´s problem is that he cannot live with 
the fact that there might be more to the world that we can’t yet prove, and that it 
might collide with the workings of the laws of nature that we know so far. 
Duncan: I don't have a problem with the fact that we don't know everything yet, I 
realize that not everything has been explored, far from that. If we had the ultimate 
knowledge of how everything works, there would be no problem to explain the mental 
events as something scientific and not at all mysterious. No neuroscientist would 
disagree that the mental is very closely connected to the physical and, therefore, it 
might have origins in the physical matter. Just because the scientific explanation of 
some phenomena is out of the reach for us at the moment does not mean that they are 
something “supernatural” and “mysterious”. 
 
 
(EXPLANATORY GAP) 
 
Konoa and Duncan refer to the explanatory gap between the physical and the mental. 
They imply that there is more in the world than just plain physical facts, namely, that 
there are mental phenomena that lack scientific explanation. Stephen Law in his book 
The Philosophy Gym mentions that current situation with mental events (such as 
consciousness) can be compared to the situation 200 years ago. Life at that point 
constituted a great mystery. People had a vague idea of how physical matter could be 
organized in such a way that it could account for a living being. They thought that 
something mysterious or supernatural had to be added to the object in order to 
breathe life in it. However, nowadays the scientists have accounted for many of the 
features that seemed to be inexplicable a couple of centuries ago. Regarding the 
present situation, even though many of the mental properties have not been 
completely explained yet, one can actually grasp how they, in the course of time, 
might be disclosed/interpreted just by taking into account the physical facts (Law, 
2003: 147). Let us see if a new character can bring some clarity in this heated 
discussion. 
 
 
 
Just as the atmosphere was getting intense, the hotdog vendor Consuela, who had 
both a highly sensitive hearing and an opinion on everything, interfered with the 
conversation. 
 
 
 
Consuela: I couldn’t help eavesdropping on this interesting discussion. If I may say 
something - I think you might be confusing yourselves. Just because the world is 
determined does not mean that you don't have free will. 
 
Everybody stops talking for a second and stares at Consuela. 
 
Duncan: How would that possibly be the case? If there is free will, then the world is 
certainly not determined anymore. 
Konoa: I tend to agree with Duncan. There is no middle ground, either the world is 
free or it is determined. If there is free will which we exercise through our individual 
choices and decisions, then the world is no more determined. Because a free choice 
breaks the chain of cause and reaction. 
 
 
(INCOMPATIBILISM) 
 
For once Kanoa and Duncan seem to agree on something, and this view is called 
incompatibilism. It is the belief that determinism and free will is not compatible. In 
his book “ An Essay On Free Will” Peter van Inwagen, an incompatibilist himself, 
comes up with an argument: 
  
 
“If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of 
nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what the laws of 
nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present 
acts) are not up to us.” (van Inwagen, 1983: 56) 
 
 
 
According to this point of view, free will is at odds with determinism, therefore if 
determinism is true, free will is impossible and vice versa. However, Consuela brings 
a new notion into the discussion, which is opposite to incompatibilism. It seems that 
she might challenge the viewpoints represented by Kanoa and Duncan. 
 
 
 
Consuela: I´m just saying that maybe these two extremes can interact and form 
something that is in between. Kanoa, like you said, we do feel like we have free will. 
So even if the world is determined it doesn't mean you can discard the concept of free 
will. But free will as a concept doesn’t mean that you can or cannot choose anything, 
it is rather describing the notion of control you have over your actions. To put it in 
very simple terms, you can't really control your heartbeats so you don't have free will 
over that particular bodily function. But this is not the control we are discussing 
here. We are talking about being in charge of certain choices, as we understand them 
in the common-sense, for instance, whether we should pick up a book from the table 
or whether to go on a holiday this year. In situations like these you do have free will. 
 
(COMPATIBILISM) 
 
 
Consuela is here presenting compatibilism, the opposite view of incompatibilism. It is 
the idea that determinism is compatible with free will. Compatibilists maintain that 
our ordinary understanding of freedom can be reconciled with determinism, that is, 
even if determinism is true we can still act freely. There are different ways how to 
formulate compatibilism. According to classical compatibilism: 
 
“As long as we do something we want to do - something we choose to do - and 
we are not externally constrained or impeded, we are acting freely. Put in 
terms of the voluntary/involuntary distinction, we can say that free actions are 
those we do voluntarily, whereas unfree actions are those we do 
involuntarily”. (Caruso, 2012: 57) 
 
 
As described in the quotation above, compatibilists argue that free action from unfree 
can be told apart by what source they originate from. Namely free actions are caused 
by our wishes or desires but unfree actions are not. As long as the actions are caused 
by the inner psychological states of a person, and are not forced on the agent by some 
external force, the actions can be considered free. Classical compatibilists argue that 
if the terms are rightly understood, there should not be a confusion that free will and 
determinism can be compatible. However, compatibilism faces threats from 
determinism regarding two types of agent’s control: first, the agent’s freedom over 
alternatives, and, second, the source of agent’s actions. The description of free will in 
terms of control could be expanded in two ways. (i) First, the Garden Of Forking 
Paths model, which deals with the agent’s control in terms of his or her ability to 
select among various alternatives, and (ii) second, the Source model, consisting of 
agent’s control over his or her actions (control understood as the agent being the 
source of his or her actions) (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; 2009; 
Compatibilism). Consuela is first introducing the Garden of Forking Paths model of 
control. 
 
 
Consuela: One way to look at it is what is called the Garden of Forking Paths model. 
Imagine that you are walking on a trail in the park when it suddenly splits into two 
trails. It´s the same way with the choices we make. We are determined up till the 
point where the trail splits but here we are presented with a situation where no 
matter which way we go, we could have acted differently. 
Duncan: What do you mean we could have acted differently? If you accept 
determinism, there is only one possible outcome, so you couldn't possibly have 
chosen differently. 
Consuela: Well, look at Candide who just ordered a hotdog over fries. He did so 
because his taste buds and psychology were determined to pick the hot dog. However, 
had his taste buds and psychology been determined to pick fries instead, he would 
have done so. You see, he could have chosen either alternative. 
Duncan: Surely this isn't what you meant to argue? You say that one is free in the 
sense that the world could have been determined differently? That is no freedom at 
all. And what do you mean the world could have been determined differently? It is 
basically the point of determinism that the events couldn't have been any different 
from what they are. Therefore, it is not true that Candide was in control of his choice. 
 
 
 
(GARDEN OF FORKING PATHS MODEL) 
 
 
Let us see what Consuela tries to say with the Garden of Forking Paths model of 
control. 
The accustomed way of thinking about person’s control over his or her actions at any 
specific moment is normally based on the opportunity to have an alternative choice 
between the actions. For example, during the elections, electorate is having a choice 
between two or several candidates, which means that even though the choice is 
limited between certain applicants, agent is still free to make his or her own choice 
between those alternative possibilities. This model of free will corresponds to the 
person’s future as a Garden of Forking Paths originating from the single past. The 
position of freely willed action coming up, as present suggests, from the persons past, 
provides a person with more than one path into the future. In simple words, the 
Garden of Forking Paths assumes the possibility for a person to act of his or her own 
free will, in the way that one have the opportunity for an action to be done 
differently. The capacity to act otherwise now is underwritten by the ability to elect 
between disjunctive options of action (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; 2009; 
Compatibilism). 
 
 
 
By serving free will under the sense of the Garden of Forking Paths model, 
determinism turns out to threaten it, since determinism dictates that at any time, 
considering the past and the laws of nature, there is only one possibility of the future, 
while Garden of Forking Paths model allows more than one opportunity for an 
agent’s action, hence more than one way of the future is possible (Iredale, 2012: 63). 
Duncan, as many other determinists, argues that this type of freedom is incoherent 
and is not solving the free will problem. 
 
 
 
Consuela: I was just saying that it is an existing belief. But try to think of control in 
the following way instead. You are in control of an action in so far that you are the 
source of the action. Of course, I'm not saying that bodily actions such as your 
heartbeat is under your control but things like picking up a book would be.       
Duncan: Once again this doesn't change anything. Sure, you might be the source of 
an action but you are never the ultimate source of it. What I’m trying to say is that no 
matter what, an action is always affected by outside things sufficient to explain the 
action. Due to this reason you are never truly in control of your acts.   
 
 
 
(SOURCE MODEL) 
 
 
Consuela is trying to persuade Duncan by mentioning the other model of control, the 
Source model. It is another way how to develop the concept of control: a person’s 
control plays a critical role in producing one’s actions. If we think of the difference 
between active actions and bodily functions it is obvious that, for example, an action 
of taking a pen from the table and the heart beating process are under different forces 
of control. In the first case, the person is the one who produces the action, while in 
the second case, the action is merely a bodily happening (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2009; Compatibilism). How can determinism become a threat for free 
will if we look specifically at the Source model? Let us look at the following 
argument: 
If an agent is able to act out of his or her own free will, there is an opportunity to 
make action differently. 
If determinism is true, no one is able to act differently from the way he or she does. 
Hence, if determinism exists, no one can act out of his or her own free will. 
 
According to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, we can call it Classical 
Incompatibilist Argument, which means that in case determinism is true, there is no 
disjunctive way of acting, which is necessary for the Garden of Forking Paths’ model. 
If we consider that determinism is true, then for every person there are actions in the 
past, which, in combination of  laws of nature and other external factors, create the 
proper circumstances for the future actions. Therefore, one can act out of free will 
only if he or she is the ultimate source, but in case determinism is true there is no 
such source of action and nobody can act out of free will, which means that there is 
no free will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; 2009; Compatibilism). 
 
 
Duncan: Free will just isn't compatible with determinism. you see, you  cannot 
control the past, can you? 
Candide: Obviously  
not. What  happened, happened, and there is nothing we can do about it now. I 
cannot ‘undo’ my choice. 
Duncan: So you do understand that you cannot control the way the past controls the 
present, don’t you? Therefore you cannot control the future either. 
Candide: Hmm… 
 
Let us look at the following argument: 
 
You cannot control the past. 
You cannot control the way the past controls the present and the future. 
Therefore, you cannot control the future. 
 
If the premises are true and provide us with the knowledge that if these premises 
cannot be broken, then the claim that we cannot control the future is true as well. 
 
Consuela: Hmm, well.. you probably have a thermostat at home right? Speaking of 
controlling the way the past controls the future... isn't that exactly what a thermostat 
does? It can control the future regarding the temperature. A thermostat controls the 
temperature by being a part of the way in which the past controls the present and the 
future. This is exactly how we are in charge of things - we are involved in the causal 
chain and, therefore, through our inner nature control the future. 
 
 
Consuela makes an attempt to break the argument using a thermostat as an example 
(Simon Blackburn has made a similar attempt to argue against the determinist 
arguments in his book Think). At first it looks like this: 
 
A thermostat cannot control the past. 
A thermostat cannot control the way in which the past controls the present and the 
future. 
Therefore, a thermostat cannot control the future. 
 
But then Consuela breaks the argument by suggesting that the second premise is 
false, and thus proves that the argument is flawed. 
 Candide: Hmm, sounds reasonable to me. So determinism is compatible with free 
will after all? 
Duncan: It is not that simple. If you rethink this argument you will see that it is 
faulty. It might seem that the thermostat has the ability to control the future. If I set 
my radiator to keep the room 20 degrees warm, then it was determined too, and 
through the chain of cause and effects this is really the past of the thermostat. The 
temperature is also determined by the past. 
Candide: But, considering temperature, the thermostat is functioning in the same way 
as my body, when I walk outside, just like the thermostat heats the room up when it 
gets cold. Am I right? 
Consuela: Wait a second, that’s exactly what I’m saying. The argument with 
thermostat is wrong! We can in fact control the way in which the past controls the 
present and the future: with biology! 
Konoa: Well, control over the future isn’t enough for free will. You need a conscious 
control in order to have free will. Body temperature is not a mental process, even 
though it has certain control over the future. 
Duncan: Your temperature only changed because you went outside, it is again again 
simply another effect of a sequence of causes. There is nothing you can say to 
overrule this fact. 
Candide: Wait a minute... are you even talking about the same thing? I mean, it 
doesn't sound like you would define “free will” in the same way. Duncan and Kanoa, 
you definitely sound to agree that free will is about having absolute free choices. But 
Consuela, on the other hand, seems to me to be talking about free will that does not 
necessarily need to break the chain of cause and effects? 
Consuela: I’m well aware that we are not talking about the exactly same sort of free 
will. But I think it’s safe to say that Kanoa’s version of free will is not the one that we 
are ready to accept. Yet, I don't think we should entirely skip the idea of free will. 
Right when it was said, Kanoa accidentally choked on the remaining piece of sausage 
and started to gasp. 
 
Konoa represents the ultimate libertarian stance - that of person being the 
fundamental source of his or her actions and, therefore, being able to break the chain 
of causality. However, this standpoint is not sufficient to challenge the deterministic 
viewpoint, thus Konoa is forced to back away. 
 
Libertarian argumentation for free will fails on two levels. The first one is the 
randomness problem, which was mentioned above regarding the quantum physics 
and micro-particle indeterminism, stating that even if the person’s actions are not 
determined, it is not enough to allow him or her free will. The second one is the 
coherence problem, namely, if libertarians insist that free will originates from 
something that is not influenced by the laws of nature (that otherwise seem to cause 
everything else in the physical world), what is this mysterious and obscure cause 
then? Is it even possible that such a vague formulation of a cause exists in the “event-
driven physical world” (Iredale, 2012: 24) as, for example, P. Read Montague 
imagines it? 
 
“Free will is the idea that we make choices and have thoughts 
independent of anything remotely resembling a physical process. Free 
will is the close cousin to the idea of the soul - the concept that ‘you’, 
your thoughts and feelings, derive from an entity that is separate and 
distinct from the physical mechanisms that make up your body. From this 
perspective, your choices are not caused by physical events, but instead 
emerge wholly formed from somewhere indescribable and outside the 
purview of physical descriptions. This implies that free will cannot have 
evolved by natural selection, as that would place it directly in a stream of 
causally connected events.” (P. Read Montague, 2008: 584 cited in 
Baumeister et al., 2010: 2) 
 
According to Robert Kane, libertarianism needs to deal with randomness and 
coherence problems by answering the following questions: “Can one make sense of a 
freedom or free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is such an incompatibilist 
freedom coherent or intelligible, or is it, as many critics contend, essentially 
mysterious and terminally obscure?” (Kane, 2002: 22) As we see, deterministic 
outlook represented by Duncan has refuted them both. However, let’s see if 
compatibilism has something to say, maybe free will can be ‘rescued’ after all? 
 
Duncan: Is this kind of freedom really something that you would like to have? When 
we think of a thermostat we do not attribute any freedom to it. To me it sounds like 
you are just going about and avoiding the problem instead of solving it. 
 
 
Duncan has a point. Many critics have argued that compatibilism is not coherent. 
Gregg Caruso mentions that the real question is, whether or not our wants and desires 
are themselves caused. Compatibilists have to agree that they are, since they embrace 
determinism. That, in turn, does not leave place for real freedom (Caruso, 2012: 57). 
It does not make sense to claim that agent’s actions are both free and determined. 
 
Duncan: So, you would accept that an action was performed out of free will, in case 
your body was not affected by any external force but that you would not necessarily 
be conscious about it? To me this sounds like saying that people who suffer from 
alien hand syndrome are acting out of free will too? 
Candide: Alien hand syndrome? What is it? 
Duncan: It is a neurological disorder when a person’s hand suddenly seems to take 
mind of its own, that is, it functions involuntarily without the person being able to 
control it. It might reach for an object, button or unbutton a shirt involuntarily, or 
there have even been registered cases when the alien hand tries to kill its owner. 
Candide: It sounds terrible. 
Duncan: It does. You wouldn’t argue that the involuntary actions that the alien hand 
performs could be thought of as the person acting freely, right? 
Consuela: No, of course, not. I am not suggesting that the hand is acting out of free 
will. I will not rule out that some deep down mental features might affect the hand. 
But a disease doesn't count anyway! The agent has to be free in a meaningful sense, 
as in free of a forced control, such as those of diseases as in this case. 
Candide: In a meaningful sense? When is your freedom meaningful, isn't it always 
like that? 
Consuela: I mean to say that the person needs to be self-conscious in order to have a 
meaningful freedom. In this case it includes the feeling of ownership of one’s body, 
thoughts and movements. One should feel that his or her movements are initiated by 
him- or herself and not by someone else. It is clearly not in the case of the alien hand 
syndrome, or if a person is under hypnosis, or under the influence of drugs. In these 
cases one’s freedom is affected. 
Candide: Isn't that a hard line to draw? I mean, in this sense you could be affected by 
anything: your choice of food, the air that we breathe and so on. 
Duncan: I see that you start to get my point. Everything in the world that happens to 
us, also affects our future. But, Consuela, I can tell that you are not quite getting it 
yet, so let me bring forward a new argument. Neuroscientists have actually made an 
experiment that suggests we don't have free will. A moment ago you were mentioning 
an example of picking a book from the table. This experiment was the first one 
indicating that even the decisions on the small scale like picking up a book from a 
table have already been made in your mind before you become aware of them. 
Candide: That is mind-blowing! How is it possible? 
Duncan: You see, Benjamin Libet, the neuroscientist who conducted the experiment, 
came up with surprising results. His studies demonstrated that in a situation when a 
person had to make a decision, for example, to flex a wrist or move a finger, an 
unconscious brain signal preceded the conscious decision to perform this action. 
 
 
(LIBET’S EXPERIMENT) 
 
Duncan has touched upon an important discussion in the field of free will and 
consciousness. In the debate of free will, where one can easily get lost in subjective 
reasoning of control and consciousness, neuroscience might offer a more solid 
grounding for the discussion. Recent discoveries in neuroscience have certainly 
added a new angle to the discussion. But how exactly has neuroscience changed the 
debate? 
 
One might wonder what neural activity could tell us about the complex nature of a 
volatile action? 
And that is in fact exactly what Benjamin Libet did. Libet set up an experiment to 
study the correlation between consciousness and a performed action. A group of 
volunteers were hooked up to an EMG (electromyography) and then asked to flex 
their wrist, at any point they wished.   
The actions performed by the subjects had to be endogenous, meaning that the 
subjects should as far as possible not be affected by external factors. Libet also 
stressed that the subjects had to want to perform the action. And the decision to act 
should entirely be decided by the subjects. The subjects had to feel in control of the 
action. 
A previous study had shown that actions were preceded by a brain signal by up to one 
second. This study had asked the test subjects to act within a time limit of thirty 
seconds (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965) (Libet, 1999). Benjamin Libet wasn’t satisfied 
with this time limit. He set up an experiment to bypass this limitation. Eventually he 
settled on a method involving a clock spinning around 25 times faster than a normal 
clock, so that each of the marked seconds corresponded to about 40 MS. He asked 
that the subjects tried to make the decision spontaneously and that they would 
remember when they were first conscious of their decision by watching the clock. 
The clock was spinning one round every 2569 ms. At the same time Libet used an 
EEG (electroencephalography) to measure the subjects’ brain activity. (Libet, 
1999:49-50) 
 
Libet was interested in the relation between the readiness potential, the act and the 
conscious awareness. The name of readiness potential (RP) or Bereitschaftspotential 
was coined by Hans Helmut Kornhuber and Lüder Deecke (Kornhuber & Deecke, 
1965). The early readiness potential is an activation of neurons in the pre-
supplementary motor area. In the studies by Kornhuber and Deecke this signal 
seemed to start approximately two seconds before the movement. The late readiness 
potential is a much more explosive reaction that occurs in the contralateral primary 
motor cortex and lateral premotor cortex. This reaction is visible around 300 ms 
before the movements’ onset (Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006: 2342). In the experiment, 
each RP was obtained from an averaged electrical recording of 40 trials. In each of 
these trials the subject performed the sudden flick of the wrist whenever he or she 
freely wanted to do so. After each of these trials the subject reported the clock time 
associated with the first awareness of the wish to move (Libet et al., 1983). Libet’s 
experiment showed that the readiness potential preceded the act by on average 550 
ms but the subjects claimed only to have become conscious about their decision 200 
ms before they flexed their wrist. Libet’s experiment suggested that the subject’s 
‘decision’ to act was made before they were consciously aware. (Libet, 1999:51) 
 
 
Duncan: You see, if your actions are initiated by your brain some time before you 
even get conscious about it, it follows that your consciousness steps in only after the 
decision has already been made. According to that, you cannot be in control in terms 
of having free will.      
Consuela: That is actually not true, is it? The initial brain signal might be the 
foundation of your actions, but your consciousness can rule it out preceding the 
actual action. I mean that you can freely choose not to act. Libet actually referred to 
this as ‘free won´t’. Let’s take the situation when Candide was ordering the hot dog. 
In the last moment he could have suppressed his urge for the hot dog and order 
something more healthy, like a salad. That would apply to what Libet meant by free 
won’t. 
 
 
(LIBET’S FREE WON’T) 
 
Consuela is right, Benjamin Libet observed in his experiments that even though the 
agent’s brain initiated a voluntary act unconsciously, the agent had the possibility to 
stop or ‘veto’ this act before it was performed. Therefore, conscious will could affect 
the outcome of the volitional process, and Libet himself concluded that the “existence 
of a veto possibility was not in doubt” (Libet, 1999: 51). Can the existence of 
conscious veto persuade Duncan that free will exists? 
 
Duncan: But having a veto on your decision doesn’t really help free will much, does 
it? It might as well be, that the conscious rejection of the initiated action is also 
determined? 
Candide: Hold on a second, I feel like I need to know more about this experiment. 
First of all, how could Libet know that simple choices like flicking a wrist could also 
apply to more complicated choices? As it seems to me, Libet’s experiment 
concentrates on this very specific time frame measuring the signal of consciousness, 
but ignores the slower time range where people’s consciousness could matter most, 
such as planning, for example? And what about the factors distracting the 
participants during the experiment? This must have been an excruciatingly boring 
task for them. I mean, imagine sitting there in the room and the only thing you have 
to do is to move your wrist now and then and not to pay attention to anything else. 
For the participants it must have been quite a tedious task to keep their attention 
focused on this one decision. It is not easy to maintain the same interest throughout 
the experiment, which makes me think that each and every choice to move the wrist 
must have been subjectively different. 
 
 
(CRITIQUE OF LIBET’S EXPERIMENT) 
 
Candide has listed some of the criticism of Libet’s experiment. Let us have a closer 
look at that. 
 
Despite Libet saying that in his opinion the experiments results did little to the 
argument against free will, it has ever since been used by many as a strong indicator 
that we do not have free will. Libet reasoned that since consciousness did come into 
play before the act was performed, it would make sense that the conscious mind 
could still ‘veto’ the action. Libet’s stance on the free will question has been 
described as a modest libertarianism, unlike the more ultimate version of 
libertarianism that argues that we have free will to choose and perform consciously 
willed actions. An interesting point to Libet’s free will or, as he described it, free 
won’t is that it reduces our free will to a long list of rejections to our brain’s 
suggestions.   
However, even without the slight disagreement on what exactly Libet’s experiment 
has to say about free will, it would seem that the experiment’s setup was not without 
problems. 
 
A common critique raised is the banality of the action. The decision to flick a wrist or 
move a finger hardly requires a whole lot of thought process, so could it not be 
possible that the action could be performed without any real consciousness. It could 
be argued that the consciousness Libet is dealing with is the consciousness that deals 
with the awareness of having performed an act and not the consciousness that deals 
with initiating the act. In other words, the question remains, whether the results 
would be the same if the task was something that asked for more thought process 
from the subjects. 
 
It might be worth dwelling for a second on the notion of consciousness or rather the 
level of consciousness in Libet’s experiment. let us take this analogy by Adina L. 
Roskies:      
                  “Imagine, for instance, that Fred wakes in the morning, gets out of bed in 
order to get to work on time, and puts on his pants one leg at a time. 
Whether he puts on the right leg first or the left leg first is an arbitrary 
choice; which one he actually does today is due to unconscious, sub-
personal neural mechanisms. Fred gets into his car in order to drive to 
work. The traffic is bad. Fred stops at the red light, because one is 
supposed to stop at red lights, but he glances at his watch and realizes 
that he will be late for his morning meeting. Deciding that he cannot be 
late again, for his boss will probably dock his Christmas bonus, Fred 
does not stop at the stop sign. Had he not considered this, he would have 
stopped. In driving through the stop sign, Fred hits a small child crossing 
the street. Would we consider Fred free or unfree? Despite the fact that 
we may argue that his “choice” of putting on the right pant leg before the 
left was not free. We would nonetheless consider his choice of action 
while driving free, and we would hold him responsible for it.” (Sinotte-
Armstrong & Nadel, 2011: 18)            
   
From here he goes on arguing that Libet´s experiment is equivalent to the choice of 
pant leg. Roskies argues that there 
is a common sense difference between these two types of actions. Isn’t there 
some truth in the difference in the two actions? It would probably be fair to 
state three different states in the relation between consciousness and actions. 
(i) Feeling like you are consciously performing an action and performing the 
action. This is probably the most familiar state. We feel like we consciously 
initiate an action and the action is performed. (ii) Feeling like you are 
consciously performing an action, without performing it. (iii) And performing 
an action but without feeling like you are the one who are consciously 
performing it. The latter is probably the most interesting in relation to free 
will, especially keeping  Roskies analogy in mind. These actions might be 
related to small everyday habits but definitely a number of disorders like 
schizophrenia, Parkinson or maybe even more interestingly Alien Hand syndrome: a 
syndrome where the people suffering from it, do not have control of a limb. 
What is maybe even more interesting is the complexity of the actions that this alien 
hand can perform without the patient in any way feeling they are in 
control. There are examples of people with this syndrome describing how, when 
they button their shirt with their left hand, their right alien hand will immediately 
unbutton it. In some cases it has even been 
reported that the alien hand have tried to strangle people when they were 
sleeping. The complexity of these actions show that at the very least 
consciousness is not necessary to perform an action. 
The question is then if these states of the relationship between consciousness and 
action only exist as absolutes or if it is possible to be more conscious in some 
situations than others (Caruso, 2012: 220). 
Another weak point one could raise about Libet’s experiment is the complexity of the 
task the subjects were asked to perform. Remembering a point on a watch while 
flexing your wrist might not seem like a difficult task but consider the time frame we 
are talking about here. The experiment suggested that the time between the readiness 
potential and the consciousness was around 350ms. It’s probably not necessary to 
point out that science disagree on whether or not actual multitasking is possible at all. 
Even if you can concentrate on two tasks at the same time it has been shown to delay 
and challenge the quality of the action performed. So with an experiment involving 
350ms you don’t need much of a delay to challenge the results. 
Recently libet have been criticized for using EEG instead of PET or fMRI. EEG 
allows for a very precise timing of the processes in the brain however it does not tell 
you much about what is actually happening. Fellow neuroscientist Wolfram Schultz 
made an experiment on goal directed behavior in primates, using a technique that 
allowed him to record the specific electrical state of individual neurons. The results 
of this experiment seem to suggest that neurons can be activated by the mental 
expectations of a result before any process of behavior had been initiated. Thus 
showing that mental evaluation of an outcome might precede the brains signals to act. 
 
 
Consuela: But Libet's experiment still allows room for free won't and in the very 
least a situation where your consciousness can overrule the external causes must 
qualify for free will in a meaningful sense. 
Candide: You mean, if consciousness can overrule the external causes for an action, 
it is enough for free will? So what you are saying is that consciousness is strongly 
related to free will? 
Consuela: Well, not necessarily overrule the external causes, it would still be 
determined, but veto the action. In that sense, yes, I would say that consciousness is 
strongly related to free well. But it is not a necessary condition for free will, I would 
say. You see, you are not always directly conscious about what you do, for instance, 
when you are walking and thinking about something, and you suddenly realize that 
you walked past the junction where you were supposed to turn left. That does not 
mean that it wasn't out of your free will that you kept walking. 
Duncan: It doesn't have to mean that you did it involuntary, no matter what, free will 
doesn't exist, which would mean that you then did everything involuntary. You just do 
it automatic, out of habit and repetition. 
 
 
(THREE HYPOTHESIS OF DETERMINISM) 
 
Candide: But what is consciousness in this sense? How does it fit into this very 
physical world you are describing? 
Duncan: It truly has been put forward as a mystery, but I don't think that just 
because we haven’t explored it yet, it means that connection between the 
consciousness and the physical world is not there. 
Consuela: Actually, I personally believe that our mental states of mind, which in this 
case would be consciousness, are connected to the physical world via neurons. 
Candide: How do you think they are connected then? 
Consuela: Well, I tend to agree to the three hypothesis of mind. 
 
The hypothesis of determinism are developed by Ted Honderich who claims himself 
to be determinist. However, as Duncan will argue later, Honderich’s views can be 
interpreted as relating to compatibilism. The three hypothesis build on each other, so 
as in the end to represent a suggestion of the connection between the mental and the 
physical. 
 
1. The hypothesis of psychoneural nomic correlation 
The first hypothesis is claiming that the mental has a connection to neurons in the 
body and therethrough supports the deterministic idea that there is nothing 
“mysterious”, as Ted Honderich and Daniel Dennett calls it, about consciousness. 
Honderich explains: 
 
 
 
"For each mental event of a given type there exist some simultaneous neural 
events of one of a certain set of types. The existence of neural event 
necessitates the existence of the mental event, the mental event thus being 
necessary to the neural event. Any other neural event of any of the mentioned 
set of types will stand i the same relation to another mental event of the given 
type”. ( Honderich, 1988: 109) 
The first hypothesis claims that through a nomic (lawlike) connection, any mental 
event, is connected to a “simultaneously neural event”. The two events together are 
called a psychoneural pair. This contains, first of all, that the one neural event does 
not come before the mental and the other way around. Second, that whatever else 
have happened, if the neural event happened, the mental event would too. Thirdly, 
turning it around, if the mental event has not happened, or arisen, neither would the 
neural event have done, this is, no mather what else have happened, also of other 
neural and mental events: Only the one can cause the other to happen, and they will 
never happen without the other.   
In this connection, there is not agreement, however, Honderich claims that; the 
mental event is non-neural, but it maintains a connection to the physical world. It is 
not to be understood that mental events are dependent on, or determined by the neural 
event. It is no more than the bound connection (109).   
The first hypothesis does not concern any so called ‘learned mental episodes’: these 
involve, for instance, knowing or remembering something, intending, wanting or 
truly believing in something. What it does evolve around is all contained by 
consciousness or experiencing (113). 
2. The Hypothesis of Psychoneural Pairs 
The second hypothesis concerns what comes before all actions, here said to be all 
mental events. The hypothesis’ claim is an explanation of “how each mental event is 
related to a simultaneous neural event”. It is stated in the following way: 
 
"Each psychoneural pair, which is to say a mental event and a neural event 
which are a single effect and in a lesser sense a single cause - each such pair 
is in fact the effect of the initial elements of a certain causal sequence. The 
initial elements are (i) neural and other bodily elements just prior to the first 
mental event in the existence of the person in question, and (ii) direct 
environmental elements then and thereafter." (247) 
 
The hypothesis then builds on the event-causal determinism that “causation is 
transitive”, meaning that when the event A, necessitated event B, and B necessitated 
event C, then A necessitated C. 
A psychoneural pair is one, as in a single, effect of a cause sequence. According to 
the hypothesis, these causal sequences originate in one of two sorts of elements: the 
first one, being “bodily or neural events just prior to the very first mental event” 
within a person. The second, consists in a direct environmental event. This means 
that the last event of an causal environmental sequence, must be neural or bodily. 
“Then and thereafter” refers to that being the last environmental event of that 
sequence. The environmental events are, of course, non-mental  (173). 
In short, the hypothesis is explaining two ways in which psychoneural pairs arise in a 
person, being either from bodily or neural sequences of events, or from 
environmental sequences of an event. 
 
3. The hypothesis on the Causation of Actions 
 
The third hypothesis builds partly on scientific knowledge and partly on the ordinary 
belief that our actions are partially bodily and partially mental. It takes cause and 
effect chain a step further, saying that actions are the effects, and the cause relies 
within psychoneural pairs and bodily events (244). It is stated as follows: 
 
 
“Each action is a sequence of bodily events which is the effect of a causal 
sequence one of whose initial elements and some of whose subsequent elements 
are psychoneural pairs which incorporate the active intention which 
represents the sequence of bodily events. The other initial elements of the 
causal sequence, at or after the beginning of the active intention, are neural 
events, non-neural bodily events, and direct environmental events." (248) 
 
So, each action is an effect of a causal sequence. The initial element of this sequence 
is a psychoneural pair. The rest of the sequence consists of other psychoneural pairs, 
neural events, non-neural bodily events, and direct environmental events as described 
in the second hypothesis. The psychoneural pairs embody ‘the active intention’ 
representing the ‘sequence of bodily events’ which a person intends to ‘do’, for 
instance, speaking, or lifting a glass of milk with the intention to drink from it (244). 
 
In Honderich’s opinion, these hypotheses could in the end suggest that neither actions 
or intentions go undetermined in the sense that they are caused by prior events, and 
so do not provide a key to free will (Honderich;1998). But we find that it could also 
fit, it not fit even better with a compatibilist view, which Consuela argues.  
 
 
Candide: But how do these hypotheses then make room for free will? 
Consuela: You see, this suggests that we can be governed by determinism, but still 
have a non-physical mentality and consciousness. 
Candide: You still haven't explained what consciousness is, you just did an attempt to 
make it determined, in my opinion. 
Duncan: I don’t see it as the solution to the question. It´s just a guess of where it 
could potentially happen. You might as well have said that it happens in the mental 
world or in the world of quantum physics, which could be true, but it doesn't tell us 
how it happens. It doesn't even give us a reason to think it does happen. It just moves 
the problem to a smaller scale, but really it is not different from when Descartes said 
that the consciousness and thought process originated in the pineal gland.    
 
Descartes was a philosopher who did an attempt to describe mental features by giving 
consciousness a special ‘seat’ in a concrete place in brain, namely, the pineal gland. 
He considered that to be the place from which all the thoughts originated. This theory 
has later been abandoned due to scientific and philosophical reasons (Blackmore, 
2005: 14). 
 
 
Consuela: As long as there is no scientific explanation of consciousness that brings it 
down to the description of physical processes in the brain, I think there is a 
possibility for free will. Duncan,  I do believe that there is a point in trying to figure 
out what role consciousness plays regarding the free will question, instead of just 
throwing the mental features away as something we do not grasp yet. 
Candide: We already agreed that you clearly didn't speak about free will in the same 
terms so you might as well leave it. Consuela, you mentioned that we are acting out 
of free will whenever we do something voluntarily. But, when is something 
involuntary then? 
Consuela: When it is forced upon you. For instance, if you were tied to a chair, or if 
you were deluded by your biological senses, meaning that not everything you think 
you experience turns out to be truth, for example, hallucinations. 
 
 
There are some concepts that should be explained first before we go on with the 
conversation. 
When considering consciousness we need to define some elements within it, such as 
intentions, decisions, choice and voluntariness (Honderich, 1988: 226), which all fall 
under the category of mental events. When taking into account how consciousness 
relates to the matter of free will, one needs to consider the term actions (209). It is 
within the question of how actions come to happen, that the subject matter of 
decisions and choices and hence free will arises (209-210). How do we act? How do 
we distinguish movements from actions? What does it contain to do something 
intentionally? Do we need consciousness to intend an action? What is the difference 
really between intention, decision and choice? 
 
 
Clarifying the concepts    
Actions often include movements, but what is it that distinguishes them from 
movements? A movement can logically be an action, as long as one is aware of it or 
has intended it. But an action does not necessarily need to be ‘reduced’ to a 
movement. Under the circumstances of ‘normal’ health condition and non-diagnosed, 
one cannot just construct a sense-making answer and speak it out without intending to 
do it. This means that there has got to be something more, something else, and the 
commonly idea coming to ones mind might be something like mentality (Honderich; 
1998; 210). But in Consuela´s view, which might be called a deterministic Neo-
behaviorist view, this might not be the case. The view reduces will to performance of 
voluntary actions and therefore not necessarily free will. In Consuela’s view she, of 
course, focuses on the possibility of free will within this view, in attempt to argue the 
compatibility of a deterministic view and free will. Voluntariness or volition is seen 
as the absence of unintended features making the action involuntary, as for instance 
misinformation of bodily sort to the person acting, or outcoming forces, as, for 
instance, a whole in the ground making one fall (210 - 211). 
So we got the involuntariness settled. We need to consider that which one can do 
voluntary, namely actions. It is easy to consider actions to derive from mental events, 
as this has been defined earlier (217), that it simply must begin with a want or a 
desire. Even when one does something out of duty, there is desire somewhere further 
deep down. For instance, when going to work, one might act out of duty all day, but 
with the desire to earn money in the end (218). But this is not enough to describe an 
intention, there needs to be more than just a desire to intend something, if not, then an 
intention would be a desire. The desire is the foundation so to say, of an intention; it 
derives from desire. On top of that is needed a belief that the satisfaction of the desire 
is available, and probable (220), and at last the belief that a motivation, to move 
according to the desire, will occur (222 - 223). These are the conditions of what we 
want to call an intention. 
 
 
Deciding and choosing consist in the same episodes as an intention, the difference 
though, is for a decision; that it has to do“ with a process of reasoning” (Honderich; 
1998; 222), and for a choice; that it has to do with preferring one thing over another 
(222). So when are these events done voluntarily? A volition is carrying out an 
intention, and according to Honderich it might as well be called active intentions, and 
intentions as they have been described up until now might be called inactive intention 
(225). 
 
 
Actions then arrive from guidance from the active intention/ volition; both the action 
and the intention take place at the same time and can change while they are 
happening. Whether volition and intention is necessary for an action to take place, 
depends pretty much on how the action is defined. It seems, for instance, quite logical 
that an action is voluntary, but saying that maybe one is shaking when speaking in 
front of people, then one is clearly aware of it. In this case, is it not an action, though 
it is involuntary? (225 and 231) . 
In the end let us in this context where the most relevant concept is voluntariness, 
define actions as everything we as people do, which is not a bodily function; meaning 
every mechanism your body has in order to function normally. An action might 
contain such states as shaking and sneezing - things that you cannot control - but that 
you in everyday say that one “does”. 
Candide: So, if we are conscious we are always free? 
Consuela: Well, if we are defining consciousness as merely being aware and awake, 
and the other conditions that it should be meaningful, then I guess so. 
Candide: What if we are not conscious, does that mean we are not free? 
Consuela: I would believe so, yes. 
Candide: So where do we draw the line? For example, are you acting out of free will 
when you sleepwalk? I mean, when you sleepwalk, you are not really conscious, but 
you are also not necessarily affected by specific external factors like drugs, for 
example. 
Consuela: I agree that it is a hard line to draw, it all depends really on how you 
define the concepts. Personally, I'd like to say that as long as it is our inside nature, 
our psychology (or cognitive nature) behind our choice, we are undeniably the ones 
in control. As Duncan said, maybe out of the only way that makes sense, but it is still 
a result of us. But I can see what you mean, it does not sound very ‘free’ to sleepwalk. 
So that is a matter of when you would say you are conscious then. And sleepwalking 
might just be a vague sort of free will, which could become even more vague by 
saying that it is not a very meaningful or relevant condition. So in the end, I don't 
think we necessarily have free will when we sleepwalk, but we might have a vague 
form of it. You see, we might be more or less conscious. Or we could call it 
consciousness on a higher level, meaning that on a higher level we are aware of what 
is going on in our minds and believe that this means that we have more free will, 
more control of what is going on, than on a lower level, like for instance 
sleepwalking. 
Candide: Are you then saying that we have to be conscious to act? 
Consuela: No, I don't think we need to be conscious to act, everything we do could be 
considered an action. I am more concerned about the control of the action. 
 
 
Consuela and Candide are here dwelling about the possible meaning of consciousness 
for free will, and it requires us to take a closer look at the levels of consciousness that 
Consuela touches upon. 
 
The concept of consciousness is quite confusing. We can distinguish two types of 
consciousness as we understand it from the everyday life. One type of consciousness 
is as we use it most often in our everyday life, that is, when we mean consciousness 
as a state when a person is awake, alert and not unconscious (as in a coma). But 
consciousness can also have a different meaning, namely, that a person is conscious 
when he or she is “aware of something, or aware that something is the case”. Though 
at the first glance, consciousness in these two ways seems to follow each other, there 
are grey areas telling us that we need to separate them. We could argue if, for 
instance, a sleepwalker is conscious. In the act of sleepwalking one might be 
conscious in a certain sense, but not fully. This grey area also covers, for example, 
dreaming, meditation, and even the difference between humans and animals (Smith & 
Jones, 1986: 209). The grey areas like these indicate that there are more conditions of 
consciousness between, let’s say, a stone and  a person who is conscious of 
something. There are more states of consciousness than just being conscious or 
lacking consciousness. Let us take a look at an example: a man is driving a car and is 
immersed into a conversation with his wife. There is a rock on the road but he 
successfully avoids it even though his attention is fully directed towards the 
conversation. If somebody had pointed out to him that he had made a tiny swing with 
a car in order to avoid the rock, it might turn out that he did not remember it because 
he did not pay full attention to manoeuvring the car. We cannot say that the man was 
either fully conscious or unconscious, that would not be the case. We can see that the 
everyday talk of consciousness is poorly captured and misleading. We simply need to 
distinguish the levels of consciousness. It might be said that on one level he was 
conscious about the rock and on another level he was not  (210). 
So in the end we might want to say that in order to be conscious, we have to believe 
that we have a belief. Meaning that we can only be conscious of what we remember. 
for instance when one have an opinion on something, they are conscious of that when 
asked, but they might not remember how they came to have this opinion, and cannot 
be said to be conscious of that. 
To be said to be on a higher level of consciousness, we need to add that one must be 
aware about their own passing state of mind. The man from before was not aware that 
he was conscious of the the rock, and he cannot therefore be said to have been 
conscious about the rock on a higher level. He might have been conscious on a higher 
level, on the thoughts passing his mind caused by the conversation with his wife 
(212). 
 
 
Duncan: All this talk about consciousness, what is the use, sure, I can understand 
how we can be conscious on different levels, but it has no effect on free will, 
whatsoever. Honestly, Consuela, I have a hard time figuring out the point of the free 
will you are talking about. And I find it totally redundant to talk about the amount of 
an illusion. 
Candide: It just simply sounds so weird. You know, as said before, it just feels 
different. Can’t it be that we are determined up until consciousness and then when we 
are conscious, and consider our choices, then we have free will? Not in a completely 
free sense; we are, of course, products of our past. But the amount of thoughts and 
experience I can work with, couldn't you say that I sort of choose between them? 
Although other events might cause me to lean more to one position than the other. 
Duncan: In the end everything is causally related. It is just the laws of nature. 
                  
Consuela: Surely, Kanoa’s idea of free will is out of the picture by now but as I said 
before, I think there is is still a room for a meaningful sense of the concept. You are 
free in so much as you are a conscious source of your actions. 
Candide: Speaking of Kanoa, I just can't help asking myself, if the world is as you 
guys claim it - what happens to moral responsibility then? 
 
He hands over the money to Consuela to pay, and sais: 
 
Candide: I have changed my mind i will have the fries instead.  
 
Leaving the hot dog stand, he hears his two remaining conversation partners 
continuing the discussion: 
 
 
Duncan: well, moral responsibility, that is so simple, nothing changes of cause. 
Consuela: hmm, I’m sure it is not as simple as you are maintaining. 
Duncan: what do yuu mean,? how could it not be? 
Consuela: You see,... 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The aim of this paper has been to explore the three debates of free will as well as 
trying to investigate the link between consciousness and free will. We have tried to 
mix the theory of free will together with examples in the form of a conversation 
among four people, each representing one stance; determinist, libertarian, 
compatibilist and a curious bypasser, questioning the other characters in order to find 
out the “truth”.  Moreover, the conversation among the characters also reflects the 
numerous heated discussions that the authors of the project experienced while being 
in the work process. The form of discussion was chosen because we found it 
beneficial to work with a philosophical problem like free will through a simulated 
conversation. The thought behind the project was to explore the validity of the three 
main views in the debate of free will and, through the example of Libet’s experiment, 
connect the free will discussion to the notion of consciousness and its role in the free 
will debate. 
During the conversation the arguments for and against each of the three main theories 
of free will have been put forward. In this process the libertarian perspective has been 
discarded, since libertarian arguments lack scientific explanations for the ultimate 
free will that it maintains. Therefore, the rest of the conversation is an attempt to find 
faults in the compatibilist and deterministic points of view. The conversation is 
concluded by a common comprehension that it is next to impossible to find 
arguments against determinism. The compatibilist, who was chosen to present and 
hold a wide range of suggestions for free will, survived the strong deterministic 
arguments only by adopting more and more of this convincing point of view. A 
conclusion was reached that the free will that compatibilists are maintaining is not the 
same free will as determinists are talking about. Even though compatibilists would 
like to retain the notion of free will as something that most people inwardly believe 
in, and as something that could provide us with the notion of moral responsibility, 
they have difficulties to defend this sort of free will against the deterministic point of 
view, since they do accept the causal relations that determinism postulates but declare 
a different understanding of free will than determinism does. 
 
 
 
Regarding the relationship between consciousness and free will, we came to the 
conclusion that compatibilists and determinists both accept the notion of 
consciousness. However, compatibilists argue that consciousness does have a saying 
in the discussion of free will, contrary to determinists who maintain that 
consciousness plays no role when discussing free will. It also seems that the levels of 
consciousness play an essential role in the amount of free will an agent can be said to 
be in charge of. 
 
 
There are several possibilities how to develop a further research from this standpoint. 
First, we have not touched upon the third way of how to understand consciousness in 
the free will debate, that is, to show how a thorough exploration of consciousness 
might lead us to the understanding that free will is an illusion. Second, consciousness 
could be explored in relation to the agent’s moral responsibility, and, lastly, 
consciousness could be examined by investigating how it affects an agent’s free will 
under specific conditions, such as drug abuse, certain health disorders, hypnosis, deep 
sleep, trance or meditation.   
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